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SOME GENERAL CRITERIA
OF MORALITY
WILLIAM F. CAHILL, B.A., LL.B., J.C.D.*
T HE MORALITY OF the conduct of men practicing law must be assessed
upon the same general standards and principles which are the criteria
of morality for all human conduct. The particular obligations of a man
acting as attorney differ from the particular obligations of the same man
acting as a pareht. The acts involved are different and, in the degree of
that difference, cannot have the same relation to the ultimate good of
man. But the acts of a man, in whatever capacity he functions, are still
the acts of a man and are therefore subject to the general standards and
principles which determine the morality of all human conduct.
Any reasoned evaluation of the attorney's professional conduct must
refer to these general criteria of morality. To state and explain these
generalities while answering particular problems would involve repetition
or difficult cross-reference. Therefore, it is proposed to set out in this
separate treatment at least the basic general concepts and those other
general concepts which are most likely to be referred to when the moral
quality of a lawyer's professional activity is discussed.
Morality and Moral Systems
Morality is the relation which a conscious and willful act or omission
of man bears to man's ultimate end. Systems of morality are conceptions
of morality, with bodies of moral principles, standards and rules derived
from and organized with reference to those conceptions. The systems
differ principally in respect to their views upon two basic problems.
*Priest of the Diocese of Albany. Professor of Law, St. John's University School
of Law.
Systems which hold man's ultimate end
and his supreme good to be pleasure are
called hedonistic; systems in which utility
is the ultimate and supreme good are utili-
tarian; systems whose supreme good is
rightness are designated as systems of
virtue. This classification of systems of
morality is subject to modification by the
fact that many systems incorporate more
than one of the elements named - pleasure,
utility, and rightness - and give varying
emphasis to the elements incorporated, as
characterizing the supreme moral good.
The division of ethical systems thus es-
tablished is further modified by the answers
given by the several systems to the question
of how man acquires knowledge of the
moral good. There are systems in which this
knowledge is held to be, either wholly or
partially, instinctive, reasoned, intellectu-
ally innate or supernaturally revealed.
From what has been said in the discus-
sion of natural law jurisprudence, it should
be clear that any natural law system of
morality is one of reasoned virtue, and that
the Christian moral system is one of virtue
in which the objects of virtue are known by
reason, either from its own examination of
nature, or from revelation, or from both.
Abstract Morality, Intrinsic and
Extrinsic
All moral systems reach some kind of
imperative, some obligatory command urg-
ing man to conform his conduct to achiev-
ing the supreme good. The imperative is
always practically obligatory, for if it were
not obligatory in the moment of action, it
could not be called either moral or impera-
tive. In natural law and in Christian moral-
ity, the imperative is, in reference to some
forms of conduct, not only obligatory, but
absolutely so.
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For man, the nature of God, the nature
of man himself, and the very structure of
human acts are necessary facts. In the order
of morals, they cannot be other than they
are in the order of creation. Viewed in ref-
erence to these necessary facts, some forms
of human conduct are seen to be essentially
required for man's achievement of his ulti-
mate end, and others are perceived to be
essentially adverse to that achievement.
These lines of conduct are said to have
intrinsic morality. Thus, for example, the
act by which man's will loves God is an
intrinsically good act, and the act by which
man willfully hates another man is intrin-
sically evil. These are deductive conclusions
from necessary facts. The essential func-
tion of man's will is to embrace what is
good; God is supremely good; men, as
God's creatures, are essentially good. All of
these facts are necessary, either because
God cannot alter them or because they are
unalterable while His creative act remains
what it is.
Clearly, some acts of man, when viewed
in their essence or nature, are seen neither
to advance man toward his ultimate end nor
to divert him from it. For example, the act
of giving food to another, considered apart
from any concrete concomitant circum-
stance and from the motives of donor and
donee, is such an act. Without knowing the
circumstances and motives, we cannot say
that the act advances either party in the
love of God, or that it turns him from that
basic moral obligation.
On the other hand, a moral precept may
be imposed by God or by a man commis-
sioned by God in nature or in revelation.
The precept may reiterate the intrinsic
morality of certain conduct. Or the precept
may urge or forbid conduct which is neither
good nor evil intrinsically - because this
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conduct, as such, is neither absolutely nec-
essary to the achievement of man's end,
nor necessarily adverse thereto. The acts
prescribed or forbidden by such precepts
are said to have extrinsic morality. The
obligation to give one day of the week to
worship, and the obligation to drive no
faster than the legal limit on highways, are
examples.
Acts which have neither intrinsic nor
extrinsic morality are called morally indif-
ferent.
These considerations of human acts, in
which the essence of the act is referred to
a necessary fact of the orders of being
and of morals, or in which the act in gross
is referred to a precept validated within
the moral order are the considerations of
abstract morality. They take no account
of the subjective dispositions of the per-
son who does the act in the concrete.
Intrinsic morality takes no concrete circum-
stances into account, and extrinsic morality
takes account of only those circumstances
adverted to in the precept. These considera-
tions are necessary steps in constructing
the rules which guide human conduct in
the concrete. But those rules can be estab-
lished only when the application of abstract
morality to actual human conduct is deter-
mined by principles and rules which take
account of those aspects of the concrete
human act which are not included in or
directly derived from its essence, and to
which the positive moral precepts do not
advert when they command or forbid the
act itself.
A Justification of Casuistry
When all possible consideration has been
given to an act's intrinsic and extrinsic
morality, the act may yet be found to be
morally indifferent - to be, abstractly,
neither good nor evil. But no act, as it
proceeds in fact from the will of a man, can
be morally indifferent. The act of a man's
will is not an abstract essence or a clause
in a precept - it is a concrete reality.
The human will's essential psychological
function is to choose the good. The will
cannot choose anything which is not pre-
sented to it by the mind as possessing some
goodness. The result of the will's satis-
faction of its appetite for goodness is
happiness.
Goods, or values, as goods are sometimes
called, are of different orders. In the order
of being, everything is good because there
is no being which is not the product of
God's creation and God can not make any-
thing which is not essentially good. The
moral order deals not with things as such,
but with the acts by which man uses things.
These acts are not good, for man by his
acts can use things, good in themselves, in
a manner contrary to the way he should
use them, and he can employ good things
to produce effects which he should not
produce. It is man's function and duty in
the moral order to use what God has
made for the purpose of bringing himself
closer to God and to use the things God
has made in manners consonant with the
nature God has given man. It is the acts
by which man uses God's creatures, himself
included, which are good or evil in the
moral order - the creatures themselves are
good in the order of being, but we cannot
predicate of them moral goodness or bad-
ness unless we look to the manner in which,
or the effect with which, some man uses
them. Those acts of man are good -
morally good - which advance man toward
his ultimate end of loving God perfectly;
those acts which turn man from that end
are evil, morally. The basic test of any
concrete human act's moral quality is this:
"Does the will of this man, when he chooses
to do this act here and now, embrace
moral evil?" If, in any of its aspects, this
concrete act diverts man from God as his
moral end, then this man's will, in choos-
ing to do this act, embraces evil.
This test is validated by reference to the
nature of the man-God relationship of
union to which man is destined. That union
is a union of love. The word "love" is used
here in its most proper intendment, as it
was used by Christ: "If you love me, keep
my commandments." "He who does not love
me does not keep my words." (John 14:15,
21.) A man loves God by willing con-
duct that conforms fully to God's plan for
him.
The science of casuistry seeks to imple-
ment that basic test of concrete morality.
This is done by analyzing in an orderly way
the psychological elements of the deliberate
and willful act of man, and the external facts
which enter into this act; referring each of
these elements and factors, in its bearing
upon the complete act, to the principles of
the moral order. The several factors of the
concrete human act are collected under
three general heads - the object of the act,
the intent of the actor, and the act's circum-
stances. These three are said to be the
sources from which the concrete act draws
its moral character.
The Moral Object of the Act
These considerations of the moral object
of the human act, the actor's intent and
the act's accidental circumstances are un-
dertaken in view of a practical problem.
Given that a man, when he deliberates upon
choosing a given act or omission, is con-
fronted with an entire concrete situation in
which the act or omission itself is only one
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factor, one may ask whether it is more
helpful to resolve the deliberation by apply-
ing moral rules which test the entire situa-
tion, or to analyze the situation into its
reasonably distinguishable factors and to
test each factor by the moral rules.
The entire situation can, of course, be
tested by asking: "Does the will of this
man, when he chooses to do this act here
and now, embrace moral evil?" The casuist
will suggest that the task of moral judg-
ment is facilitated by analyzing the broad
object of the will's choice, and by test-
ing the resulting factors separately. Taking
the whole moral situation, he first sets
aside for later evaluation the purposes
for which the actor may choose to do the
act in question. These purposes may in-
clude, in any given case, those which only
this act will serve, those which this act will
best serve, and those which would be served
equally well or better by an act different
from the act here proposed. In any case,
the actor's purpose or purposes can be
clearly distinguished from the substance of
the act he contemplates. What one does is
related to, yet distinguishable from, why
he does it.
Then those remaining factors, whose re-
moval from the present situation would not
alter the primary impact which the choice
of this act will have upon the moral order,
are set aside to be tested separately as acci-
dental circumstances of the act. What re-
mains after this second process of analysis
and abstraction is the moral object or moral
substance of the act itself.
In the broad but philosophically accurate
sense, the object of any function includes
everything which offers material upon
which the function may operate and every-
thing which affords the function a goal.
.Thus, in the physical order, the function of
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assimilation has food and drink as the ma-
terials upon which it operates, and the
production of substances suited to the
body's needs is the function's goal. In the
moral order, the broad object of the will's
function includes all the elements of the
concrete situation which in any way influ-
ence or morally qualify the act's choice of
conduct. Included are all the physical,
emotional and spiritual factors of the situ-
ation which may influence the will to choose
or to reject a line of conduct, and all the
factors which may determine that conduct's
capacity and tendency to advance man
toward, or turn him from, the perfection
which is his goal in the moral 6rder.
The casuist uses the term "moral object
of the act" in a narrower sense. It is the
object of the act, thus narrowly taken, which
is referred to the principles and precepts of
the moral order to establish the act's ab-
stract morality. When we discuss abstract
morality, the term, "object of the act," does
not give us great trouble. We can say that
the act's object is what the act does in the
moral order. We describe the object of the
act of murder as "the unjustified killing of
a human being," and the object of the act
of blasphemy as "the conduct of a creature
which directly derogates from the honor
due to his Creator." But when we start from
the act which Jones did at the corner of X
and Y streets yesterday at 11:31 a.m. and
then attempt to establish what elements of
the concrete situation, existing in that place
at that moment, pertain to the moral object
or the moral substance of Jones' act, and
what other elements of the situation are
morally accidental circumstances of Jones'
act, the task is not so easy.
There are cases in which reasonable men
will differ in resolving this problem, but in
most practical cases a thorough canvassing
of the situation and careful consideration
of its elements will enable one to make a
reasonably clear and reliably confident reso-
lution. Many practical difficulties arise from
a failure to relate properly facts of the
physical order, which are known to us
through the key concepts of cause and
effect, to acts of the moral order which are
intelligently understood only in terms of
ends and means.
Such difficulties arise particularly when
the act examined is one whose abstract
moral quality is intrinsic and the act is not
clearly described in the terms of any pre-
cept. Thus, hatred is an evil act primarily
because it is a perverse, unnatural use of a
faculty God has created. By hatred we
mean hatred of a man - a voluntary detes-
tation of a person, as distinguished from a
detestation of his evil qualities or evil con-
duct and from merely physical or emotional
revulsion against him. The human will is
made to embrace good and to reject evil.
Hatred of a man, who, as God's creature,
shares some of his Creator's goodness is a
perverse use of the will and therefore is
evil. Hatred of any man is an intrinsically
evil act for the secondary reason that it
tends necessarily to produce evil effects. It
diminishes the will's capacity to love what
is good, even the capacity to love God.
Given opportunity and means, and absent
restraint and interference, hatred leads also
to the production of external unjust harm.
The investigator whose preoccupation is
cause and effect will give attention only to
the secondary reason for hatred's evil qual-
ity. And because he does not test for ends
and means, he may judge hatred good when
its effects are happy, useful or beneficial,
and find it evil only when its effects are
dolorous, troublesome or harmful.
To avoid errors in morally evaluating
human acts, we give especially close atten-
tion to the moralists' doctrine on the bear-
ing which an act's effects have upon its
moral object. What the moralist first wants
to know about an effect is whether this
effect has followed from a necessary or
non-necessary tendency of the act. The
tendency is called necessary when the effect
to which it is directed will follow in any
case where the act is perfected -in any
case where the act is willed and fully im-
plemented by its author and no cause in-
dependent of him intervenes to frustrate
the act's tendencies to produce effects. For
example, the act of looking tends, with
physical necessity, to produce a mental
image, and always has this effect unless the
visual function is defective, or the external
conditions for seeing are not present. We
can also speak of psychologically necessary
tendencies (though the moralists will usu-
ally group these with the physically neces-
sary tendencies). The repetition of omis-
sions to control an emotion tends neces-
sarily to decrease the ability of reason to
exercise control of that emotion.
When an effect of an act violates a moral
principle or precept, any act whose neces-
sary tendency is to produce that effect is
evil in its moral object. This is so because
the person who does such an act puts into
operation the act's necessary tendency to
produce evil. If the tendency fails to pro-
duce fully the evil effect, that effect is not
barred by the will of the man who acted.
Rather, the full effect of the necessary ten-
dency which the actor put in motion is
frustrated by the inadequacy of the ener-
gies and other means employed by the
actor, or by the intervention of a cause in-
dependent of him. By putting the necessary
tendency into operation when he chose to
act, the actor's will embraced the moral
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evil of the effect. For that evil is, so to
speak, drawn from the effect in prospect,
through the necessary tendency of the act
to produce it, to the act itself in whose
object the tendency is a factor. Effects, to
the production of which an act tends neces-
sarily, are called direct effects of the act.
Such tendencies in the act's physical
object may bring the act within a contingent
principle or precept of the moral order.
Thus, the physical object of the act of
injecting a large amount of morphine into
a patient's body includes the necessary ten-
dency of that act to produce the effect of
the patient's temporary loss of reasoned
control of his own actions. This tendency
may bring the act of administering the drug
within the moral principles and precepts
which forbid even temporary direct depri-
vation or relinquishment of rational control
except in the presence of proportionate
cause. The presence or absence, in the
same act, of tendencies to produce other
effects, such as relieving pain or minimiz-
ing shock, will be factors in the moral
determination that proportionate cause ex-
ists for depriving the patient directly, though
temporarily, of rational control.
Where the necessary physical tendencies
of an act are seen to be directed to produce
a direct effect whose voluntary production
contravenes an absolute moral duty, this
aspect of the act's physical object deter-
mines the moral object of the act. The act
of misrepresenting the truth to another has,
in the physical or psychological order, the
necessary tendency to produce in the mind
of anyone to whom the act is addressed an
intellectual assent to a falsity. Because mis-
representation has this physical object, the
act falls under the absolute and specific
moral principle which prohibits lying. Thus,
the physical or psychological object of this
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act is an essential factor in the act's moral
object.
Where an effect follows on an act, but is
not the product of a necessary tendency of
the act, the effect is called an indirect effect
of the act. In contrast to the direct effects of
an act, its indirect effects do not follow in
every case where the act is perfected. For
example, speaking the truth may harm
another in some cases, but the act of speak-
ing the truth has no necessary tendency to
harm anyone. Causing harm is not a factor
in the object of that act. If the act of speak-
ing the truth does harm in a given case, this
happens by reason of the intervention of
some cause distinguishable from the act
itself. Such intervening causes are called
morally accidental circumstances.
No act is subject, immediately and con-
clusively, to an absolute principle of the
moral order, such as the principle that lying
is intrinsically evil, merely because the act
has a non-necessary tendency to produce an
evil effect. Yet an act which has an acci-
dental tendency to produce evil indirect
effects does come under the basic moral
principle that man should always act rea-
sonably. But a conclusion condemning the
act as evil cannot be derived from that
principle without the intervention of fur-
ther premises. A man does not act reason-
ably when he does not take pains, propor-
tionate to the evil effect, to prevent that
effect from following indirectly or acci-
dentally upon his conduct.
Finally, an act may be forbidden or pro-
scribed by a positive moral precept, pre-
cisely because it has a tendency, though not
a necessary tendency, to produce certain
evil effects. In this last case only does
the act's tendency to produce indirect effects
determine immediately the act's moral ob-
ject, because here it is the non-necessary
tendency which brings the act under the
terms of the precept. An obvious example
is the law which makes reckless driving a
crime. The law as a reasonable exercise of
human authority is morally binding. The
term, "reckless driving," describes a sort of
driving which tends, though not necessarily,
to produce harm to persons and property.
Thus, by way of further example, a
natural physical or psychological tendency
of a seller's marking up retail prices and
inviting the buyer to "dicker" as to the final
price is to overcharge the buyer. The ten-
dency is not necessary where the invitation
is not illusory. Therefore, such conduct is
not evil by the test of any absolute moral
principle. In situations where buyers' pur-
chasers include a great number of items
and they have little or no time to "dicker,"
the seller's invitation to "dicker" does not
reasonably control the tendency of his con-
duct to result in overcharging. The seller
acts unreasonably and, therefore, immorally
if he continues to mark up in this situation.
Further, in a situation where the immoral
tendency of the practice of marking up
prices may be controlled by a conscientious
seller, a legal precept may quite reasonably
forbid the practice altogether.
In establishing the moral object of an
act, we must refer to the moral principles,
not the act's effects as such, but the act's
capacity and necessary tendency to pro-
duce the effects; or we must refer to the
moral precepts, the act's capacity and non-
necessary tendency to produce the effect.
The will of man, when he determines to
do an act, embraces immediately the act
itself. The effect of the act is embraced
only to the extent that its effect is implicit
in the act's capacities and tendencies.
Every willful determination to do an act
has the capacity and the necessary tendency
to realize concretely the entire moral .object
of that act and to produce the direct effects
of that act. We may distinguish the primary
effect realized in the will faculty itself, when
it chooses to do the act, from the effects
realizable in the actor's other mental and
physical faculties or in the external world.
Where, in a giyen case, an act is willed and
none but its primary effect is realized, it is
either because the actor does not employ
means adequate to perfect the other effects
which his act tends to produce in his mental
and physical faculties and in the world
outside him, or it is because some agency
independent of the actor intervenes to frus-
trate his efforts. But in every case where
a man has determined to do an act his will
has embraced any good or evil which is
found in the act's object. This is a logical
implication of Christ's words, ". . . anyone
who even looks with lust at a woman has
already committed adultery with her in his
heart." (Matt. 5:28.) The concrete realiza-
tion of those necessary moral effects of an
act which are ulterior to the effect of the
act of choice upon the will itself, adds to the
morality of the concrete act only by pro-
longing and intensifying the will's embrace
of good or evil.
The Intent of the Actor
Every concrete act of man, if it is deliber-
ate and free, is done with a purpose or
intent. If the act is not deliberate and free,
and therefore purposeful, it is not a human
act. This principle, induced from the facts
of human psychology and deduced from
the nature of human freedom, is analogous
to the principle of physical inertia. As a
body at rest or in motion tends to retain its
present state unless an opposed force inter-
venes, the will, not acting or acting in a
given direction, does not begin to will any-
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thing or give over its willing or change its
object unless some purpose intervenes.
The purpose is offered to the will by the
intellect, in the process of deliberation.
Only after the will chooses the purpose,
does the will choose to do the act which the
intellect, in the earlier deliberation which
presented the purpose, or in a new delibera-
tion, has judged appropriate as a means for
achieving the purpose. Physically, the tem-
poral sequence of the will processes -
choosing the end and electing the act as a
means thereto - may be imperceptible, but
causally the former process is always ante-
cedent to the latter. The intellect finds pur-
poses for the will's choice in one or more
of three areas of its knowledge: in the
will's desire which arise apart from its delib-
eration upon this concrete act or in effects
which the act deliberated is capable of pro-
ducing directly; or in the indirect effects
which the intellect judges will follow, at least
probably, from the performance of this act
in the present circumstances. A man chooses
to do an act in the concrete either because
he perceives the act's own capacity and nec-
essary tendency to produce effects which he
desires, or because he perceives that the con-
currence of some accidental circumstances
makes it certain or probable that the act,
in this case, will produce such an effect.
The effect he desires is the actor's end in
acting - this desire is the intent, or purpose
or motive of his act.
No man's intent or purpose in doing a
concrete act is, or can be, morally indiffer-
ent. Every choice of purpose by the human
will is either a good or an evil choice from
the viewpoint of virtue. Whatever purpose
the will chooses is good, either really or ap-
parently. The purpose chosen is truly a
moral good if, by choosing it, man advances
toward his ultimate end; it is apparently
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good if, though it contains some reflection
of the Creator's goodness, the present choice
of it diverts man from his ultimate end of
achieving the union of love with God which
is his supreme good.
Having chosen a purpose, the human will
next chooses an act as a means of realizing
that purpose. At this point, we should advert
to the principle, "a good end does not justify
evil means." The act done is evil intrinsically
if, when viewed in reference to necessary
facts of the moral order, the act's essence
is seen to be adverse to man's achievement
of his ultimate end. It is evil extrinsically if
the act violates a precept valid in the moral
order. In either case, the will's adoption of
the act as a means to achieve a good pur-
pose does not purge the act of its evil
character. Rather, the will by determining
to give concrete existence to an evil act,
embraces evil, albeit reluctantly - with
regret that it cannot achieve its desired good
end by good means.
The solution of "conflicts of obligation"
offered by the moralists may occasion a
misconception that a good end does, some-
times, justify evil means. Where one of the
"conflicting obligations" is a negative or
prohibitory one imposed by a principle of
intrinsic morality - like the obligation not
to kill an innocent person directly - that
obligation prevails over any precept and
over any affirmative obligation of intrinsic
morality. Where both of the obligations
said to be in conflict are imposed by pre-
cepts or by affirmative intrinsic morality,
the conflict may be resolved upon certain
general moral principles.
Appeal may be made to the greater dig-
nity, strictness or urgency of one obliga-
tion. A man's duty to'feed his family pre-
vails over his duty to pay his debts, and the
latter duty prevails over the duty to give
alms - unless the donee of the alms is in
dire necessity and the creditor is not. Ful-
fillment of one's affirmative duty to worship
God is justly and obligatorily omitted while
one is bound by justice or even by charity
to attend the sick.
The principle of epikeia or that of the
"excusing cause" may also be invoked.
These principles have application where an
affirmative duty of natural law or any duty
of precept is excused in an individual case
because its performance will entail an alto-
gether extraordinary hardship. It is consid-
ered that no lawmaker intends his law to
oblige in such circumstances. Either epikeia
or a balancing of moral values might per-
mit a man to exceed the speed limit while
driving a critically injured person to a
hospital.
In all these cases, the end does not jus-
tify the means, but the principle which
made the means evil is overruled by a prin-
ciple which makes the means permissible.
It will be noted that the obligations of
any law, natural, divine positive or human,
whose non-observance involves serious
harm to others, individually or in commu-
nity, are not held waived by epikeia. The
speeder en route to the hospital cannot
disregard the duties, imposed by natural
law and by the law of the state, to drive
with reasonable care for the safety of the
patient and of the public.
It is, of course, true that a good end
"justifies" an act which, abstractly consid-
ered, is morally indifferent. The act of
giving food to another is morally indiffer-
ent in the abstract. But where, in the con-
crete, it is done for a morally good purpose,
the act is made virtuous by the .act's pur-
pose - the actor's end "justifies" the act;
provided, however, that there is present no
accidental circumstances which makes his
act immoral.
The Circumstances of the Act
Every concrete human act comes into
existence in circumstances which may affect
the act's moral character. If, in determining
to do the act in these circumstances the
actor's will embraces evil, then his concrete
act is a morally evil act though, in his intent
and in the moral object of the act, there be
no evil.
The circumstances which may modify
the morality with which an act is endowed
by its object and its author's intent are
classified by the moralists under seven
heads: "the mode," "the person," "the mat-
ter," "the place," "the time,' ''the means,"
"the effects." The mode and the effects will
be considered in some detail; the other five
circumstances can be explained and exem-
plified summarily.
"The person" indicates considerations of
a special duty in the author of the act or of
a special right in a person affected by the
act. The moral quality of a lawyer's act
may differ accordingly as he acts in the
character of attorney or in that of executor,
and accordingly as his act is directed to a
client or to a stranger. "The time" and "the
place" of an act's performance may alter
its morality or its efficacy to produce or
discharge moral obligations. The passage of
time may, by force of just law, extinguish
moral rights and duties. The place where
process is served may determine that the
service imposes no moral obligation to obey
its mandate. "The means" here do not refer
to the act itself which is always a means to
achieve the actor's purpose, but to subordi-
nate means, by which the act principally
considered is to be accomplished in a given
case. Thus, in considering the morality of
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making a statutory defense, we must attend
to the moral character of the offers of
proof which will be made to effectuate the
defense.
The Circuinstance of Indirect Effect
In the enumeration of circumstances,
"the effect" refers to the act's accidental or
indirect effects. An indirect effect is one
which follows from an act though the act
has no necessary tendency to produce it.
In the physical order of causality, the act
may be the entire efficient cause of the
effect, or it may contribute only part of the
efficient causality which produces the effect.
Furthermore, the act may be only a dis-
posing cause where the activity does not
produce the effect either wholly or partially,
but removes obstacles or creates conditions
permitting the efficient causes to operate
effectively. In any of these cases, the effect
is indirect as to the act in question, if the
act has no necessary tendency to produce
this effect.
To illustrate the three ways in which an
effect may follow upon an act, we will take
it that the buyer in three different cases fails
to understand his seller's clearly spoken
invitation to "dicker." The seller's act of
marking up prices may be the full physical
or psychological cause of the buyer's mis-
understanding that the prices marked are
fixed prices. Or the seller's act of marking
up may join with the statements volun-
teered by a third person as a partial cause
of the buyer's misunderstanding that the
prices are fixed. Or it may be that the
buyer, looking at the price tags, written in
characters unfamiliar to him, takes them to
be written in code. This misapprehension
does not lead him to make any judgment as
to the fixed or tentative character of the
prices. But this misapprehension, arising
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out of the seller's act, does leave the tourist
buyer at the mercy of his guide who, in
hope of compensation from the shopkeeper,
calls off to his client prices higher than
those marked and then effects the sale at
prices marked. The effect in all cases is
that the buyer is overcharged. But in none
of these cases is the overcharge an effect
following from a necessary tendency in the
seller's act of marking up the prices - it is
always an indirect effect of that act.
Where the actor intends the indirect
effect there is no doubt of its influence upon
the morality of his choosing to act. Here
he has made the indirect effect his purpose
for choosing the act. If the effect is evil, his
intent is evil, and his will to act for this
purpose embraces evil.
The moralists say that where an effect
is thus taken into the actor's intent, the
effect is "voluntarium in se." An effect
which the actor does not thus intend is said
to be "voluntarium in causa."
Where the actor does not intend an indi-
rect effect of his act, the moral quality of
that effect does not necessarily influence
the moral quality of the concrete act. But
where such effect is morally evil, this moral
evil may be embraced by the actor's deter-
mination to do the act or by his determina-
tion to permit his past act to realize its
indirect evil effects. He thus embraces the
evil of the indirect effect if all three of the
following conditions are fulfilled:
1. That the actor, when he makes either
determination, foresees that the evil effect
will follow, at least probably, upon his act.
2. That the actor can, without hardship
proportionate to the evil effect, either pre-
vent the effect from following his act or
abstain from acting.
3. That the actor has a moral obligation to
prevent or not to cause the evil effect.
The seller, for example, who has no inti-
mation of his buyer's failure to understand
the invitation to "dicker," and who has no
other reason to know that the buyer cannot
"dicker" to a fair price, does not foresee the
evil indirect effect of his act of marking up
prices.
When a buyer voluntarily ignores or
rejects the seller's offer to "dicker," the
seller can cut the price to the minimum he
would be willing to accept after bargaining.
The seller has a duty, in charity and in
justice, not to take from the buyer more
than the goods are fairly worth. But one
factor in the determination of a fair price
is the buyer's willingness to pay. Though
the marked price, as an asking price, may
be higher than the price the seller hopes to
get, it will usually be a just price where it
is paid by one who voluntarily ignores the
opportunity to bargain. Injustice would
enter if bargaining imposed upon the buyer
some unreasonable hardship, so that his fail-
ure to bargain was not truly voluntary.
Some of the moralists present their doc-
trine on acts having evil effects apart from
their doctrine on the object, intent and cir-
cumstances as the sources of morality in
the concrete act. They postulate a situation
in which a concrete act has two effects, one
evil, and the other good or at least morally
indifferent. The conditions they require for
acting in such a situation, or for permitting
an act already done to perfect its evil
effects, are broader than the conditions
stated above, because in this presentation
of the doctrine the act's object, the actor's
intent and the circumstances other than
"effect" must be adverted to explicitly. The
conditions are these:
1. The act itself is morally permissible. (Its
moral object and its circumstances are not
evil.)
2. The evil effect is not in the actor's intent.
(He foresees it as a probable consequence
of his act, but he does not choose the act
as a means to achieve the evil effect as an
end. It is assumed that his purpose, what-
ever it be, is not evil.)
3. The evil effect is not, in fact, a cause of
the good or indifferent effect. (If it were,
then one who chose to do the act would
truly, though perhaps reluctantly, employ
the evil effect as a means to achieve the
good effect, and his will would thus embrace
evil.)
4. There is just and proportionate reason
for permitting the evil effect.
The problem of proportion, which arises
in applying the fourth condition just stated
and the second of the three conditions enu-
merated previously, requires particular ex-
amination. The burden of the first three
conditions set out immediately above is to
establish that the actor's will has embraced
evil in no direct way, in the object of his
act, in his purpose, or in the means he elects
to employ. That being settled, it may be said
fairly that the actor does no more than per-
mit evil to follow from his act. The will to
permit evil does not, in and of itself, em-
brace evil. God permits evil to follow from
his act of creation - He foresees evil and
does not prevent it.
A man's determination to permit evil to
follow on his act must be subjected to the
basic moral test of reasonableness which
applies to all human acts. If that determina-
tion is made without comparing the inter-
ests the actor pursues with the moral values
violated by the indirect effects of his act,
the determination to act evinces an unrea-
sonable state of mind. Such a state of mind,
if voluntary, is morally evil. Further, if a
man acts in disregard of the evil indirect
effects of his act, or in the face of a serious
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disproportion between its evil and good ef-
fects, an ulterior question is raised. Is the
subject's disposition to merely permit the
evil, or is it to embrace the evil, as his pur-
pose or as a means to his purpose?
To permit one's act, present or past, to
produce evil effects, even indirectly, is im-
moral, unless one judges that he has just
and proportionate reason to permit the
occurrence of the evil effects. The principal
elements in which the justifying reason is to
be proportioned to the evil effects are the
following: (1) The species and dignity of
the virtues against which the evil offends
and the greater or less gravity of that
offense - as against the importance, in the
moral, intellectual and material orders, of
the act's good and beneficial effects which
the actor desires; (2) The immediacy or
remoteness with which the act or its good
effect causes or occasions the evil effect;
(3) The greater or less probability that the
effects, good and evil, will ensue from the
concrete act.
Scandal and Cooperation in
Wrongdoing
While the primary purpose of this article
is to summarize the general principles of
the moral system and particularly the prin-
ciples of casuistry, two rather specific prin-
ciples which have frequent application to
moral situations which arise in legal prac-
tice will be presented in this section and in
the section following.
Any act by which one person concurs in
another's wrongdoing has, as at least one of
its effects, the other's wrongdoing. Of
course, the wrongdoing may enter also into
the concurring act's other moral circum-
stances, into the object of the concurring
act, or into the intent of the person concur-
ring.
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The concurrence in wrongdoing is classi-
fied by the moralists either as scandal or as
cooperation in wrongdoing, according as the
concurrence is given to one not yet resolved
upon doing evil, or to one already deter-
mined to do wrong. Cooperation or scandal
which truly causes the wrongful act is said
to be affirmative. If it is not causal, merely
establishing conditions which facilitate the
wrongdoer's causal production of the
wrong, the concurring act is called affirma-
tively or negatively occasional, accordingly
as it removes obstacles or offers opportuni-
ties. Concurrence which affects material
causes and conditions - furnishing tools,
opening locks, and the like - is physical
concurrence. Moral concurrence exercises
such influences as advice, example and
encouragement. All these various forms of
concurrence in evil doing are governed by
the same moral principles.
Where the concurrence is formal, that is,
where the person concurring intends the
evil which the other's act involves, there is
no question that the act of concurrence is
an evil act. But to the malice which such evil
intent confers upon the concurring act, a
further evil quality is added. The duty im-
posed by charity to procure not only the
material but also the spiritual welfare of
all men is breached when one concurs
intentionally in another's act of wrong-
doing. The malice of the act of concurring
formally with a wrongdoer is further in-
creased where that act, in view of its object
or circumstances, violates obligations im-
posed by other virtues. Such obligations
arise when the concurring person is subject
to a duty to prevent the wrongdoing or its
evil effects, by reason of a special moral
relation between him and the wrongdoer
or between him and those harmed by the
wrongdoing. They arise also where the con-
curring act is evil by reason of its own object.
Where the concurrence is material; be-
cause the person concurring does not in-
tend, but merely permits, the evil which
the other's act involves; the cooperator in
evil or the person who gives scandal does
not, in his purpose, embrace evil. If he
does embrace evil, it must be in the object
or in the circumstances of his concurring
act.
If the concurring act is evil because its
object is evil, or because of evil found in
its circumstances apart from the circum-
stances of concurrence, the malice of the
concurring act is aggravated by the acci-
dental circumstance that it concurs with
another's wrongdoing, though the wrong
done by the other is not intended by the
person who concurs with his act. So,
though a burglar makes his unlawful entry,
having no desire or purpose that a rape
shall occur in the house, yet knowing that
his breaking will facilitate the entry of a
rapist, the burglar's sin against moral prin-
ciples and precepts which protect property
rights takes on added malice by breaching
the duty of charity which binds him to both
the rapist and the victim, and by breaching
also the duties imposed by those virtues
whose object is the victim's right of physical
and moral personal integrity.
The evil found in the object of the con-
curring act may, of course, be precisely the
same as that which is the object of the
other's wrongdoing. In such case, the
other's wrongdoing is embraced directly by
the concurring person's will. Though it is
not his purpose that the wrong shall occur,
he elects the wrong as a means to the end
he intends. For example, take the concur-
ring act of a person who, to prevent a
libertine from desiring his sister, pays a
prostitute whom the libertine desires but
cannot afford.
But if the concurring act is not evil -
in its intent, in its object, or in those of its
circumstances which have not reference to
its influence upon another's wrongdoing -
that circumstance of reference does not
make the concurring act evil in every case.
In view of that circumstance, the other's
wrongdoing is, in such case, an indirect
effect of the concurring act. The wrong-
doing is not a direct effect of the concurring
act, because the case postulates that the
act's object does not include a necessary
tendency to produce the other's wrong-
doing. Thus, the act of supplying a drug
or an instrument which has no moral use
is evil in its object, whereas the act of
supplying a drug or instrument which has
uses, some of which are moral and some
immoral, is not evil in its object. The latter
act may be evil in its indirect effects.
So we apply to the acts of material con-
currence in wrongdoing the moral doctrine
on indirect effects. Material concurrence in
the wrongdoing of another is morally per-
missible where these conditions are verified:
1. The concurring act itself is not evil in its
object, in its author's purpose, or in some
of its circumstances apart from its refer-
ence to the other's wrongdoing, and
2. The concurring person, when he chooses
to act, does not foresee that the other's
wrongdoing will follow, at least probably,
upon his act, or
3'. The concurring person cannot, without
hardship proportionate to the evil of the
other's wrongdoing and its effects, either
prevent the wrongdoing or its evil effects,
or abstain from his own act.
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The proportion to be established between
the concurring person's hardship and the
evil which the other's wrongdoing involves
has the following as its principal elements:
(1) The seriousness and strictness of the
moral obligations breached by the other's
wrongdoing, and of those which bind the
concurring person to prevent the wrong-
doing, or its evil effects, are weighed against
the importance, in the moral, intellectual
and material orders, of the hardship in-
volved in preventing the wrongdoing or its
evil effects or in abstaining from the con-
curring act.
(2) The immediacy or remoteness which
characterizes the reference of the wrong-
doing or its evil effects to the concurring
act as a cause or occasion is-considered.
(3) The greater or less probability that the
wrongdoing and its evil effects will ensue
from the act of concurrence, also the
greater or less probability that the hardship
to the concurring person will ensue from his
determination to prevent the wrongdoing
or its evil effects or from his determination
to abstain from the concurring act, are esti-
mated.
In evaluating the hardship referred to in
item (1) supra, two special considerations
are helpful in many cases. A hardship
which affects the concurring person's ordi-
nary and honest means of livelihood weighs
more heavily than a hardship, quantita-
tively similar, which affects his extraordi-
nary income or profit. A concurring act
which is one done in the normal and honest
course of the cooperator's profession or bus-
iness is more easily excused, when a wrong-
doer adapts it to his evil purposes, than a
concurring act which is extraordinary to the
cooperator's usual occupation.
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The Circumstance of Mode
The moral mode of a concrete human
act consists in the advertence and freedom
with which the act is done. Without these
qualities, or either of them, the act is not
truly a human act. Yet human acts differ
in the degree of advertence and freedom
which accompany them.
For our purposes, the human act's quali-
ties of advertence and freedom may be
illustrated best by referring to acts of resti-
tution of damage. For the moralists, the
term restitution describes not only any act
by which, under the impulse of the virtue
of commutative justice, a thing or a right is
given to the person entitled to own or pos-
sess it after it had been taken unjustly, but
also any act by which, under the impulse
of the same virtue, damage unjustly inflicted
is repaired or compensated. In reference to
the reparation of damage, the duty which
arises immediately out of moral principles
is quite different from the moral duty
which is created by a just human law or by
a just judgment applying human law. The
moral duty which has a legal basis is estab-
lished by reference to the just, but objec-
tive, standards of conduct imposed by law;
the moral duty which concerns us here is
established by reference to just standards
applied subjectively, for this is a duty which
is created in the forum of conscience, and
conscience applies all criteria subjectively.
Any duty to repair or compensate dam-
ages which arises immediately in the forum
of conscience has three necessary premises:
1. The damage is caused in violation of a
strict right of the person harmed. Thus, for
example, one has no duty to restore the loss
caused by denying alms.
2. The person obliged must have caused
the damage efficaciously, and not - in the
moral sense of the word - accidentally;
the act must have had at least a probable
tendency to cause the harm.
The moralist would find liability in very
few of the allergy cases which have suc-
ceeded under the tests of tort law.
3. The person obliged must have caused
the unjust damage with "theological fault."
This fault may have been incurred by the
act which caused the damage or in some
subsequent neglect to take an opportunity
to prevent the damage.
Theological fault is a consequence of a
sinful act - it is the duty to account to God
for an act in which moral evil was wilfully
embraced. Any act or omission is sinful if
it violates some obligation imposed by God,
through the natural law or divine positive
law or just human law, and provided that
the act or omission is done with knowledge
that it violates the obligation, and with
psychological freedom.
When there is lacking all such knowl-
edge, by reason of ignorance or inadver-
tence, there is no sin and no theological
fault. Any earlier act or omission which
was done voluntarily and undutifully with
knowledge that it would likely cause the
ignorance or inadvertence here intervening
was, of course, sinful and involved fault.
Where the knowledge of the act's malice
is imperfect, the sin and the fault are cor-
respondingly diminished.
When psychological freedom is entirely
lacking, because of a drug which removes
inhibitions, for instance, the act or omission
is not sinful and has no fault. Any earlier
act or omission done voluntarily and unduti-
fully with knowledge that it would likely
cause the present lack of freedom was sinful
and involved fault.
Where the psychological freedom is
partly impaired, by a neurosis, for example,
the sin and the fault are diminished in pro-
portion to the impairment of freedom.
Problems arising under the moral duty to
repair or compensate damage caused effica-
ciously and unjustly will illustrate the rules
relating knowledge and freedom to sin and
fault.
Where one damages another, knowing he
efficaciously causes damage but believing,
because of ignorance which arose without
his fault, that the person damaged has no
strict right in the object damaged, he does
not incur the obligation to repair the
damage.
For the purpose of making a picnic fire,
a vacationist burns an old and dilapidated
boat which he knows could be of consider-
able service to a local fisherman, but which
he honestly believes to be a derelict, though
it is actually the property of the fisherman.
Though the vacationist has acted unchar-
itably, he has no obligation to repair the
damage done the fisherman.
When one acts in the honest belief that
the act he does, though it might possibly
cause a given harm, is not at all likely to
do so, he has no obligation to repair or
compensate the damage which in fact fol-
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lows upon his act. The man who flicks a
cigarette into a street gutter is not obliged
to compensate passersby for damage caused
to their clothing by a fire which his cigarette
started by falling upon gasoline which, un-
known to him, floated upon the water flow-
ing in the gutter.
Similar to ignorance and inadvertence, in
their moral effects of barring or diminishing
sin and theological fault, are the defects
of freedom. A threat which so frightens as
to upset one's voluntary control of his
actions, removes all sinful character and
all fault from those actions, and therefore
bars the imposition by conscience of a duty
to repair the damage caused efficaciously
and with objective injustice. A lesser threat
will diminish sin, fault and the obligation
to repair or compensate.
Bonum ex integra causa, malum ex quo-
cumque defectu. This axiom summarizes
the moral doctrines stated in this article. In
the context of the sources of the morality
of the human act, the axiom declares that a
good act is one whose every element is good
or at least permissible, and that an act is
bad whose author's will embraces evil in the
act's moral object, in the author's purpose,
or in any accidental moral circumstance of
the act.
